Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado: A Critical, but Incomplete, Step in the Never-Ending War of Racial Bias by Spiess, Natalie A.
Denver Law Review 
Volume 95 Issue 3 Article 8 
November 2020 
Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado: A Critical, but Incomplete, Step in the 
Never-Ending War of Racial Bias 
Natalie A. Spiess 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Natalie A. Spiess, Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado: A Critical, but Incomplete, Step in the Never-Ending War of 
Racial Bias, 95 Denv. L. Rev. 809 (2018). 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact 
jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
PERA-RODRIGUEZ V. COLORADO: A CRITICAL, BUT
INCOMPLETE, STEP IN THE NEVER-ENDING WAR ON
RACIAL BIAS
ABSTRACT
The realization of America's oft-cited promise of equality and justice
for all has long been inhibited by the pervasive racism that permeates all
aspects of American life. For centuries, courts and legislatures have
worked to eliminate racial bias and its crippling effects from the nation's
laws and courts. However, one place where racial bias has largely been
left to flourish unchecked is within the realm of juries and their delibera-
tions. Until quite recently, jurors nationwide were free to convict criminal
defendants with near impunity based solely on prejudicial notions about
who a defendant is because of the color of the defendant's skin.
Since the nation's earliest days, a legal principle called the "no-im-
peachment rule" largely barred using the content of jury deliberations to
challenge a criminal conviction. In Peha-Rodriguez v. Colorado, the Su-
preme Court finally held that when a criminal defendant's guilty verdict is
likely the result of a juror's overt racism, the Sixth Amendment supersedes
the no-impeachment rule and allows defendants to challenge the validity
of their guilty verdicts using that juror's racist comments. This was a
groundbreaking and long overdue ruling. But the ruling was also reserved,
modest, and incomplete.
This Case Comment first argues that the Supreme Court correctly de-
cided Pefia-Rodriguez. Statistics and the experiences of people of color
show that racial bias within the criminal justice system is a massive, tow-
ering, and disruptive force. These same things also show that existing safe-
guards designed to protect criminal defendants from racism are exception-
ally ineffective and that the critical importance of attacking racism from
all angles ranks paramount to the policy goals underlying a strict no-im-
peachment rule. However, this Comment also argues that the Court's de-
cision in Pefia-Rodriguez will be largely meaningless without a corre-
sponding mechanism that puts jurors on notice about the consequences of
using racism to convict criminal defendants. To best maximize the impact
of the no-impeachment rule's new racial bias exception, the exception
should be coupled with jury instructions that let all within the courtroom
know that basing a criminal conviction on racism is both forbidden and
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INTRODUCTION
Three black defendants are convicted of drug trafficking.' Days after
the conviction is entered, a juror comes forward with shocking news-
while carpooling to the trial, a fellow juror remarked that "[t]he niggers2
are guilty" and "[a]ll the niggers should hang."3 The trial court is aware of
the allegations.4 But the conviction stands.5 A man of Middle Eastern de-
scent is convicted on money laundering and wire fraud charges.6 A week
later, a juror runs into one of the lawyers at the grocery store and remarks
that, while deliberating, another juror argued that the defendants were
guilty because "[a]ll Arabs are liars, are thieves."7 This accusation too is
1. United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1112, 1119 (9th Cir. 2001).
2. While drafting this Comment, I went back and forth on whether writing out the racial slurs
used by these jurors added anything of value to my work or whether including the actual slurs only
added hurt without improving the substance. But one of the reasons that he United States still has
such a large problem with racism is our collective refusal to have meaningful conversations about race
because those conversations make us uncomfortable. Including the word "nigger" in this Comment
makes me uncomfortable. And that's precisely why I included it. If we, as a nation, truly want to
eliminate racism, we must be willing to engage in conversations that make us uncomfortable. It would
be hypocritical of me to not do the same here.
3. Henley, 238 F.3d at 1113-14.
4. Id. at 1113.
5. Id. at 1114.
6. United States v. Shalhout, 507 F. App'x 201, 202 (3d Cir. 2012).
7. Id. at 203.
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brought to the trial court's attention.8 The conviction stands.9 A Hispanic
defendant is convicted of sexual harassment.10 Minutes later, a juror in-
forms defense counsel that during jury deliberations, a juror stated that
Mexican men "take whatever they want" and "believe they [can] do what-
ever they want[] with women."" Defense counsel informs the trial court
12 1 3about this alleged blatant racism. Yet still the conviction stands.
To the lay person, and even many lawyers, it would seem that state-
ments as racist as these, made by ajuror while deciding a defendant's fate,
would be automatic grounds for reversal.14 How could jurors possibly
make such biased remarks about criminal defendants and not violate the
right to an impartial jury? 5 But until March 2017, ajuror could do exactly
that without violating the Constitution in the slightest.'6
Throughout history, the jury has been referred to as "a tangible im-
plementation of the principle that the law comes from the people";7 "the
only anchor ever yet imagined by man, by which a government can be held
to the principles of its constitution"; and "[the most] gratuitous public
school ever open, in which every juror learns to exercise [his or her]
rights . . . and becomes practically acquainted" with the nation's laws.19
But what all those glowing quotes gloss over is that, despite the constitu-
tional guarantees of fairness and impartiality,20 the system of trial by jury
has never been fair or impartial, particularly when it comes to race.21 And
for more than 230 years, criminal verdicts that resulted from a juror's ex-
pressed racism could not be challenged because of a legal principle known
22
as the no-impeachment rule.
In Peha-Rodriguez v. Colorado,2 3 the Supreme Court finally held that
the Sixth Amendment mandates an exception to the no-impeachment rule
when a criminal verdict is found to have been based strongly on a juror's
racist beliefs.24 But as monumental and critically important as this decision
8. Id.
9. Id. at 203-04.
10. Pefa-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 861 (2017).
11. Id. at 861-62.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 862.
14. Mark Joseph Stem, Read Anthony Kennedy's Stirring Denunciation of Racially Biased Ju-
ries, SLATE: THE SLATEST (Mar. 6, 2017, 2:49 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the-slat-
est/2017/03/06/readanthonykennedy_s_stirringopinioninpe a rodriguez v colorado.html.
15. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
16. See Peila-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 855, 869.
17. Id. at 860.
18. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine (July 11, 1789), https://founders.ar-
chives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-15-02-0259.
19. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 315 (Henry Reeve trans., The Pa.
State Univ. 2002) (1835).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
21. See Peiia-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868-69.
22. See id at 863, 869.
23. 137 S. Ct. 855.
24. Id. at 869.
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is, it may be just another ineffective step in the war on racial bias if the
decision is not coupled with efforts to put jurors on notice that there is no
place for racism in the black box.
The United States has a damaging and enduring history with racism
that continues to prevent whole fulfillment of the nation's guarantees of a
251fair trial and due process for all. Based strongly on that history, this Com-
ment will argue that Peiha-Rodriguez was correctly, if only modestly, de-
cided. Part I of this Comment will review the legal background of the no-
impeachment rule and its limited exceptions. Part II will examine and sum-
marize the Court's decision in Peila-Rodriguez. Part III will discuss why
a racial bias exception to the no-impeachment rule is necessary and sug-
gest one way to maximize the exception's impact. Part III's analysis will
proceed in several sections. It first discusses the entrenched racism that
exists and flourishes throughout the criminal justice system. It then exam-
ines why existing safeguards against racial bias are ineffective and why
the public policy behind a strict no-impeachment rule is misplaced in the
face of overt racism. Last, it provides a set of model jury instructions that
could be utilized by courts to deter juror racial bias and encourage jurors
to report such bias when it seeps into their deliberations.
I. BACKGROUND
The right to a fair and impartial jury is a critical piece of the U.S.
criminal justice system.26 It is a right that has long been considered "a fun-
damental safeguard of individual liberty" and a right that was deemed im-
portant enough by the framers to be one of a limited number enshrined in
the Constitution.27 And yet, for more than two centuries, there was no uni-
form legal remedy available to criminal defendants whose convictions re-
sulted from a juror's racial bias.2 8 This contradiction and grave injustice
stemmed from an eighteenth century legal principle called the no-im-
peachment rule.29
The original no-impeachment rule holds that after a verdict has been
entered, juror testimony about a jury's deliberations cannot be used to
challenge the validity of a final verdict, even if that testimony alleges grave
misconduct or blatant racial bias on the part of a juror.3 0 This rule first
emerged in the 1785 English case of Vaise v. Delaval,31 where an English
court refused to allow a verdict to be challenged based on juror affidavits
25. See id. at 867-68.
26. Id. at 860.
27. Id.
28. See id. at 867.
29. Id. at 861.
30. See Impeachment of Verdict, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); Stem, supra note
14.
31. (1785) 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (KB).
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alleging that the verdict was determined through a game of chance.32 This
ruling stemmed from a strong belief that jurors were not competent o tes-
tify about their own verdicts and deliberations because any testimony
about juror misconduct that came from a juror would be unreliable.33
Following the ruling in Vaise, a strict ban on using any juror testi-
mony to challenge the validity of jury verdicts took hold first in England
and then in the United States.34 However, by the mid-nineteenth century,
various state and federal courts within the United States began to modify
the Vaise rule's ultrastrict bar on postverdict testimony.35 In 1852, in
United States v. Reid,3 6 the Supreme Court barred a verdict from being
challenged after receiving juror testimony that a newspaper was sent to
37and read by a juror. Yet in dicta the Court noted that here may be cases
"in which it would be impossible to refuse [uror testimony] without vio-
lating the plainest principles of justice."38 Less than twenty years later, in
a direct rebuke of the English no-impeachment rule, the Supreme Court of
Iowa held in Wright v. Illinois & Mississippi Telegraph Co. 3 9 that juror
affidavits alleging that a damages award was calculated by averaging the
individual suggestions of the jurors could be used to challenge the validity
of the final verdict.40
The decision in Wright quickly became known as the "Iowa Rule."4 '
Under the Iowa Rule, while jurors could not testify about "subjective be-
liefs, thoughts, or motives," they could testify about "objective facts and
events" that occurred during deliberations.42 The nation took a strong lik-
ing to the Wright approach, with a dozen states and several federal district
32. Colin Miller, Dismissed with Prejudice: Why Application of the Anti-Jury Impeachment
Rule to Allegations of Racial, Religious, or Other Bias Violates the Right to Present a Defense, 61
BAYLOR L. REV. 872, 880-81 (2009) (describing the facts and holding of Vaise, 99 Eng. Rep. at 944).
33. Susan Crump, Jury Misconduct, Jury Interviews, and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Is the
Broad Exclusionary Principle ofRule 606(b) Justified?, 66 N.C. L. REV. 509, 513 (1988); Miller,
supra note 32. Before Vaise, courts in England had occasionally and very cautiously allowed post-
trial juror testimony to challenge the validity of verdicts. Miller, supra note 32. The ruling in Vaise
eliminated that practice. Id.
34. Miller, supra note 32, at 881.
35. Id. at 881-82.
36. 53 U.S. 361 (1851), overruled in part by Rosen v. United States, 245 U.S. 467 (1918).
37. Id. at 361-62, 367. In Reid, the newspaper in question contained a report about the evidence
in the case that the juror was deciding. Id. at 362. According to the juror, he only read the report to
refresh his memory and the report had "no influence on his verdict" as "he had made up his mind
before he read [the paper]." Id.
38. Id. at 366.
39. 20 Iowa 195 (1866).
40. Miller, supra note 32, at 881-82 (describing the facts and holding of Wright, 20 Iowa at
197, 210, 212, 215).
41. Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 863 (2017).
42. Id. The Iowa Rule as stated in Wright expressly allowed juror testimony to show that "a
juror was approached by a party"; a verdict was reached by "the drawing of lots"; the verdict was a
quotient verdict; and extraneous facts not in evidence were presented to the jury. Jessica L. West, 12
Racist Men: Post- Verdict Evidence of Juror Bias, 27 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 165, 172
(2011) (citing Wright, 20 Iowa at 210). Not admissible was "any matter which does not essentially
inhere in the verdict itself," including testimony that a juror did not agree with the verdict, had misun-
derstood the jury instructions, or was "unduly influenced" by other jurors' statements. Id (quoting
2018] 813
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courts adopting Iowa's loosened interpretation of the no-impeachment
rule.43 Another modification to the no-impeachment rule, coined as the
"federal approach," emerged in the early twentieth century.4 4 Under the
federal approach, jurors were only allowed to testify about events that
were "extraneous to the deliberative process" such as "reliance on outside
evidence4 5 or personal investigation of the facts."46 All testimony about
deliberations, even if that testimony was about objective facts and events,
was barred.4 7
The Supreme Court's early decisions failed to establish a clear pref-
erence for either version of the no-impeachment rule.48 But in 1915, the
Court explicitly rejected the Iowa Rule, holding in McDonald v. Pless49
that "juror testimony about objective events in the jury room" could not
be used to challenge a verdict.5 0 However, the Court again qualified its
ruling by reiterating that in the "gravest and most important cases" it may
be impossible to exclude juror testimony "without 'violating the plainest
principles of justice.'"
The no-impeachment rule's development peaked in 1975 when Con-
gress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence.5 2 Initially, the House of Rep-
resentatives sought to adopt a no-impeachment rule similar to the Iowa
Rule, fearing that a strict rule would promote injustice.53 But the Senate
disagreed due to concerns that adopting the Iowa Rule would destroy the
Wright, 20 Iowa at 210). "The line the court drew, essentially, was between evidence of 'the mental
processes ofjurors,' which was inadmissible, and of 'overt acts,' which was admissible." Id. (quoting
Jack Pope, The Mental Operations ofJurors, 40 TEX. L. REv. 849, 851 (1962)).
43. Crump, supra note 33, at 516 n.51.
44. See Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 526 (2014).
45. Outside evidence under the federal approach included newspapers, dictionaries, and state-
ments made to or in the presence ofjurors about facts not in evidence. See Peha-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct.
at 863; 27 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 6071, 432-33 (2d ed. 2007).
46. Peha-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 863.
47. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 125 (1987). Under the federal approach, jurors were
deemed incompetent to testify about "a compromise verdict, a quotient verdict, speculation as to in-
surance coverage, misinterpretation of instructions, misuse of evidence, mistake in returning a verdict,
and misinterpretation of the guilty plea." 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 45.
48. Sometimes the Court endorsed the Iowa Rule. See Mattox v. United States, 146.U.S. 140,
148-49 (1892) (holding that juror testimony alleging that a prejudicial newspaper and a bailiffs com-
ments about the defendant had influenced the jury could be admitted to challenge the verdict). Other
times, the Court held more narrowly that juror testimony should rarely be admissible to challenge a
verdict. See United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. 361, 366 (1851).
49. 238 U.S. 264 (1915).
50. Peha-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 864 (summarizing the facts of McDonald, wherein the Court
held that evidence of a quotient verdict was inadmissible).
51. Id. (quoting McDonald, 238 U.S. at 269).
52. Id.
53. Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., Prelim-
inary Draft ofProposed Rules ofEvidence for the United States District Courts and Magistrates, 46
F.R.D. 161, 290 (1969) ("The familiar rubric that a juror may not impeach his own verdict, dating
from Lord Mansfield's time, is a gross oversimplification. ... [S]imply putting verdicts beyond effec-
tive reach can only promote irregularity and injustice."); Miller, supra note 32, at 887.
814 [Vol. 95:3
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54
confidentiality of deliberations and encourage litigants to harass jurors.
Instead, the Senate proposed a narrower rule similar to the federal ap-
proach. The Senate's version won and was signed into law becoming
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b).
Rule 606(b) created a strict no-impeachment rule with very few ex-
ceptions.5 7 Under Rule 606(b), jurors cannot testify about and the court
cannot receive affidavits or evidence on "any statement made or incident
that occurred during the jury's deliberations; the effect of anything on that
juror or another juror's vote; or any juror's mental processes concerning
the verdict or indictment."5 8 This strict bar on postverdict testimony is sub-
ject to three narrow exceptions.5 9 These three exceptions allow jurors to
testify about (1) extraneous prejudicial information, (2) outside influence,
and (3) mistakes made in entering the verdict onto the verdict form.60 Fol-
lowing the federal passage of Rule 606(b), most states followed suit by
enacting their own no-impeachment rules that strongly mirrored the exact
terms and exceptions of the federal rule.6 '
But something glaring was missing from this new rule. Despite the
nation's evinced belief in and insistence on juries rendering fair and im-
partial verdicts, Rule 606(b) and its state counterparts had completely for-
gotten to account for allegations of juror racial bias in the text of their no-
impeachment rules.62 The legal precedent surrounding these codified no-
impeachment rules also shied away from addressing the question of
54. See Crump, supra note 33, at 521 n.86; see also S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 13-14 (1974), as
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7060 (quoting McDonald, 238 U.S. at 267) ("[L]et it once be
established that verdicts solemnly made and publicly returned into court can be attacked and set aside
on the testimony of those who took part ... and all verdicts could be, and many would be, followed
by an inquiry in the hope of discovering something which might invalidate the finding. Jurors would
be harassed and beset by the defeated party in an effort to secure . . . evidence of facts which
might . . . set aside a verdict. If evidence thus secured could be thus used, the result would be to
make . . . private deliberation[s] the constant subject of public investigation-to the destruction of all
frankness and freedom of discussion and conference."); 117 CONG. REC. 33,645 (1971) (daily ed. Sept.
28, 1999) (statement of Sen. McClellan) ("The mischief in [the House rule] ought to be plain for all
to see. . . . Were it possible to overturn a decision because ... it was not based on precedent, but bias,
and this was an issue that could be litigated, it would indeed be brought before the courts. .. . I do not
believe it would be possible to conduct trials . .. if every verdict were followed by a post-trial hearing
into the conduct of the juror's deliberations.").
55. Peiha-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 864.
56. Id at 864-65.
57. Id.
58. FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(1).
59. Id. 606(b)(2).
60. Id. Broadly speaking, Rule 606(b) bars the admission ofjuror testimony to demonstrate that
jurors compromised, misunderstood the law or evidence, were strapped for time, were under the in-
fluence of drugs or alcohol, hurled expletives at each other, or threw chairs. THOMAS A. MAUET &
WARREN D. WOLFSON, TRIAL EVIDENCE 48 (5th ed. 2011). In contrast, Rule 606(b) does allow jurors
to testify about statements made by bailiffs, prejudicial newspaper stories or unadmitted documents
that found their way into the jury room, and whether jurors visited the crime scene or conducted ex-
periments with the exhibits. Id.
61. See 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 45, at § 6071; Miller, supra note 32, at 890.
62. See 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 45, at § 6071 nn.60-75.
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whether Rule 606(b) effectively allowed jury verdicts tainted by racism to
stand.6 3
The Supreme Court's initial decisions about Rule 606(b) also failed
64to address this question. After the rule's enactment, the Supreme Court
interpreted its exceptions in two cases, repeatedly holding that Rule 606(b)
prohibits challenging verdicts with juror testimony that relates to "the in-
ternal, mental processes by which the verdict was reached."65 In Tanner v.
United States,66 the Court barred the use of juror testimony alleging jurors
were drunk and high during the trial from challenging the final verdict,
holding that voluntarily ingested substances were an internal, not external,
67 6influence. And in Warger v. Shauers, the Court held that juror testi-
mony alleging that another juror lied during voir dire about improper sym-
pathies towards a party was also barred because personal beliefs are inter-
-69
nal, not external, information.
While stating in Warger that "[t]here may be cases of juror bias so
extreme that . .. the jury trial right has been abridged," the Court neglected
to clarify what those cases might be and whether cases involving racist
jurors were covered.70 In fact, the Court almost implied the opposite by
repeatedly holding in both Tanner and Warger that Rule 606(b)'s near to-
tal ban on using juror testimony to challenge verdicts did not violate the
Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury 71 because preexisting safe-
guards-specifically voir dire and courtroom oversight-sufficiently pro-
tect that right.72 Despite a history of confronting racial animus within the
jury,7 3 the Supreme Court had little to say about Rule 606(b) and its im-
plied bar on challenging jury verdicts after learning of a juror's alleged
racism.74
63. See Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 865 (2017). It was generally accepted by
state and federal courts that racial bias was neither extraneous information or outside influence and
thus did not fit into one of the three exceptions written into Rule 606(b). See Andrew D. Leipold,
Objective Tests and Subjective Bias. Some Problems ofDiscriminatory Intent in the Criminal Law, 73
CHI-KENT L. REV. 559, 581 (1998). And until the Supreme Court's decision in Peia-Rodriguez, the
federal Courts of Appeal were split on whether the Constitution required a separate racial bias excep-
tion, while only sixteen states recognized such an exception. Peha-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 865.
64. Peha-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 866-67.
65. Id. at 866; STEPHEN GOODE & OLIN GUY WELLBORN III, COURTROOM HANDBOOK ON
FEDERAL EVIDENCE 371 (2016).
66. 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
67. Id. at 116-17, 122.
68. 135 S. Ct. 521 (2014).
69. Id. at 529.
70. Pelia-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 866-67.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
72. Warger, 135 S. Ct. at 529; Tanner, 483 U.S. at 127.
73. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-86 (1986) (holding that litigants may not
exclude a prospective juror because of race); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527 (1973) (hold-
ing that the Constitution sometimes requires defendants be allowed to voir dire on racial bias); Strauder
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309-10 (1880) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
excluding a juror because of his or her race), abrogated by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
74. See Pefia-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 867.
816 [Vol. 95:3
A CRITICAL BUT INCOMPLETE STEP
But perhaps it was just waiting for the right case. On April 4, 2016,
the Supreme Court agreed to hear Peila-Rodriguez,7 5 which asked the pre-
cise question that the courts had dodged for so many years: whether the
no-impeachment rule could constitutionally bar "evidence of racial bias
offered to prove a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial
jury." 76 The Court's precedent on Rule 606(b) indicated the answer was
likely yes because the Court strongly believed that existing safeguards
were enough to guarantee impartiality, even in cases of racial bias.77 How-
ever, the Court's repeated insistence that in some cases it would be impos-
sible to exclude certain juror testimony without "violating the plainest
principles of justice" provided an opening for the Court to find a racial
bias exception to the no-impeachment rule.7 8 In Peila-Rodriguez, the Court
finally embraced that dicta.79
II.PERA-RODRIGUEZ V. COLORADO
A. Facts
Miguel Pefia-Rodriguez was charged with unlawful sexual contact
and harassment after he allegedly sexually assaulted two young girls at a
race track.80 During voir dire, potential jurors were repeatedly asked if they
could be impartial and not a single juror indicated any inability to be fair
"based on rac[ial] or any other bias."8 1 But immediately following Pefla-
Rodriguez's conviction, two jurors contacted defense counsel and alleged
that another juror had expressed vitriolic anti-Hispanic sentiment towards
Pefia-Rodriguez.82 According to sworn affidavits taken from both jurors,83
during deliberations Juror H.C. commented that Pefia-Rodriguez was
guilty because "[Pefa-Rodriguez was] Mexican and Mexican men take
whatever they want"; "Mexican men had a bravado that caused them to
believe they could do whatever they wanted with women"; and "nine times
out of ten Mexicans were guilty of being aggressive towards women."84
B. Procedural History
Based on Juror H.C.'s statements, Pefia-Rodriguez moved for a new
trial. The Colorado trial court denied the motion, holding that testimony
75. Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 136 S. Ct. 1513 (2016) (granting petition for certiorari of the
case ofPefia-Rodriguez v. People, 350 P.3d 287, 297 (Colo. 2015)).
76. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7-8, Peila-Rodriguez, 136 S. Ct. 1513 (No. 15-606), 2015
WL 7008801, at *7-8.
77. See Warger, 135 S. Ct. at 529; Tanner, 483 U.S. at 127.
78. United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. 361, 366 (1851), overruledin part by Rosen v. United States,
245 U.S. 467 (1918).
79. Peria-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869.
80. Id. at 861.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 861-62.
83. Id. at 861.




about jury deliberations is inadmissible under Colorado Rule of Evidence
606(b) which, like its federal counterpart, bars the use ofjury testimony to
challenge a verdict unless the testimony is about extraneous information,
outside influence, or a verdict form mistake.86 The Colorado Court of Ap-
peals affirmed, stating that Juror H.C.'s statements did not fall within an
exception to Rule 606(b) and were inadmissible.87 The Colorado Supreme
Court also affirmed, relying heavily on the Court's decisions in both Tan-
ner and Warger.88 The United States Supreme Court then granted certio-
rari.89
C. Opinion of the Court
Justice Kennedy authored the opinion of the Court.90 Justices Gins-
burg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined Justice Kennedy's full opin-
ion.91 The Court reversed the Colorado Supreme Court's ruling, holding
that the Sixth Amendment requires an exception to the no-impeachment
rule when jurors overtly rely on racial bias to convict a criminal defend-
ant.92 Justice Kennedy began by discussing the vital importance of jury
trials, as well as the important policy considerations behind the no-im-
peachment rule, reiterating the Court's long held belief that while juror
misconduct is extremely troubling, the jury system would likely not sur-
vive efforts to eliminate every instance of improper behavior.93 However,
Justice Kennedy quickly noted that such policy concerns are not para-
mount in instances of racism, "a familiar and recurring evil that ... risk[s]
systematic injury to the administration of justice."94
Justice Kennedy then distinguished Peila-Rodriguez from Tanner
and Warger, stating that racial bias within the jury system is different from
mere juror misbehavior because the jury is "a criminal defendant's funda-
mental 'protection of life and liberty against' racial prejudice."9 5 Although
86. Id. Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b) states that
[u]pon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to
any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the
effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to
assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in
connection therewith. But a juror may testify about (1) whether extraneous prejudicial in-
formation was improperly brought to the jurors' attention, (2) whether any outside influ-
ence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror, or (3) whether there was a mistake in
entering the verdict onto the verdict form. A juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement
by the juror may not be received on a matter about which the juror would be precluded
from testifying.
COLO. R. EVID. 606(b).
87. Pefia-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 862.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 862-63.
90. Id. at 860.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 869.
93. Id. at 860-61, 868.
94. Id. at 868.
95. Id. (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 310 (1987)).
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sympathetic to concerns about harming the jury system through efforts to
make it infallible, Justice Kennedy dismissed those concerns, stating that
efforts to eliminate racism from the black box were not efforts to perfect
the jury but instead efforts to ensure that the jury comes "ever closer to the
promise of equal treatment under the law."
96
The majority opinion then asserted that the existing safeguards cited
to so vociferously in Tanner and Warger97 are insufficient at preventing
racial bias from infiltrating a jury.98 General questions about a juror's im-
partiality may fail to expose specific biases, while more targeted questions
can exacerbate xisting prejudices without exposing racist beliefs.99 And
the stigma attached to racial bias can make it difficult for jurors to report
biased statements before rendering a verdict because it is hard to call a
fellow juror a bigot. 00 While noting that this ineffectiveness alone is not
dispositive, Justice Kennedy asserted that the nation's long history with
racism provided a sound basis to treat such bias with extra caution.o 0
Based solidly on the repeated and extremely damaging impact that
racial bias has on the promise of equal treatment and impartial juries, the
Court held that the Constitution requires a racial bias exception to the no-
impeachment rule.1 02 More specifically, when a juror evinces a reliance on
racial bias in convicting a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment right
to an impartial juryl03 requires that juror testimony about such alleged bias
be admissible to challenge the validity of the resulting verdict and any de-
nial of the defendant's right to a jury trial.104 However, for this exception
to apply, a juror's biased statement(s) must exhibit "overt racial bias that
cast[s] serious doubt [up]on the fairness and impartiality of the jury's de-
liberations and [final] verdict."10 5 And the statement must strongly show
that racial bias was "a significant motivating factor in the juror's vote to
convict."l 06
Justice Kennedy then concluded by acknowledging that the Court's
decision was merely a single stride in the nation's ongoing efforts to "over-
come race-based iscrimination" and that much more would be required,
96. Id.
97. The existing safeguards that the Court relied on when deciding both Tanner and Warger
were voir dire, courtroom oversight, and preverdict juror reporting of racist statements. Id. at 866.
98. Id. at 868-69.
99. Id. at 869.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 868-69.
102. Id.
103. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
104. Pefia-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868-69.
105. Id. at 869.
106. Id. How significant of a factor this bias must be was a question that the Supreme Court
declined to answer, instead leaving the determination of when a statement is racist enough for the
racial bias exception to apply to the discretion of the trial courts. Id. at 870. The Court also entrusted
the trial courts with the development of the exact nuances of the racial bias exception, including any
local rules or jury instructions that might be helpful or applicable. Id. at 870-71.
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perhaps in the form of local rules or jury instructions,107 to effectuate the
decision's full potential.os
D. Justice Alito's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas,
authored the main dissent. 109 Justice Alito's dissent focused heavily on the
public policy considerations surrounding the confidentiality of the jury
process, asserting that such policy concerns outweighed the injury in-
curred by litigants whose convictions were the result of racial bias.1 10 In
addition to this balancing, Justice Alito also asserted that the Sixth Amend-
ment and its corresponding precedent do not require a racial bias exception
to the no-impeachment rule because nothing in the amendment's text or
history suggests that the right to an impartial jury depends on the type of
bias exhibited by a juror.1
To justify his balancing, Justice Alito asserted that juries "occupy a
unique place in our justice system" because they-unlike judges and law-
yers-deliberate in largely unregulated spaces and "debate, argue, and
make decisions" as ordinary people do.1 12 According to Justice Alito, al-
lowing the jury room door to be pried open by a racial bias exception
would destroy the confidentiality that jury deliberations thrive on and
could easily lead to negative ramifications. 113 These ramifications, includ-
ing unwilling and harassed jurors, are all consequences that could break
the jury system beyond repair.l14
Justice Alito also based his balancing on the belief that existing safe-
guards do adequately prevent racial bias from infiltrating juries because
lawyers can carefully frame voir dire questions to elicit bias and use per-
emptory strikes to remove suspicious jurors. " And even if jurors are too
hesitant to call out racism,. Justice Alito argued that he policy supporting
the no-impeachment rule still reigns supreme because postverdict report-
ing is particularly disruptive to the legal system.'16
107. Id. at 871. In his majority opinion, Justice Kennedy specifically stated that strategically
crafted jury instructions can be vital in both explaining ajuror's duty to deliberate in a bias-free manner
and limiting the use of the racial bias exception to rare cases. Id. at 871. 1 agree and also believe that
such instructions can best maximize the racial bias exception's impact on the jury trial system. See
infra Section III.D.
108. Pefia-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 871.
109. Id. at 874 (Alito, J., dissenting).
110. Id.; see infra Section IlI.C. for a broader discussion of these public policy concerns.
I11. Pehia-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 882-83 ("What the Sixth Amendment protects is the right to
an 'impartial jury.' Nothing in the text or history of the Amendment .. . suggests that the extent of the
protection provided ... depends on the nature ofa jury's partiality or bias.... Nor .. . [does] the Sixth
Amendment recognize[] . . . [a] hierarchy of partiality or bias.").
112. Id. at 874.
113. See id. at 874-75, 884-85.
114. See id. at 884-85.
115. Id at 878, 880.
116. Id at 882.
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E. Justice Thomas's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Thomas authored a separate dissent to explain why an
originalist reading of the Constitution bars finding a racial bias exception
to the no-impeachment rule." 7 When the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments were ratified, jurors were not allowed to supply any evidence of
misconduct to challenge a verdict.'18 According to Justice Thomas, be-
cause common law held that criminal verdicts could not be challenged
with juror testimony alleging juror misconduct, there was no legal basis
for a racial bias exception to the rule.'1 9 While Justice Thomas noted that
there may be valid reasons to modify or even eliminate the no-impeach-
ment rule, he adamantly asserted that such a decision be left to the political
process.120
III. ANALYSIS
In Peiha-Rodriguez, the Court finally gave teeth to its long line of
dicta stating that there may be cases where juror testimony cannot be ex-
cluded "without violating the plainest principles ofjustice."l 2 1 By holding
that the Constitution demands an exception to the no-impeachment rule
when a juror's overt racial bias influences a vote to convict,122 the Court
took a critically needed step towards further limiting the havoc that racial
bias can wreak within the legal system. However, that step was incom-
plete.
This Part will first examine the intricate ways in which racial bias
continues to permeate the criminal justice system and deeply inhibits he
promise of "equal treatment under the law."' 23 This Part will then argue
that the legal system's current safeguards against racial bias are woefully
ineffective at preventing jurors from relying on racism when convicting a
criminal defendant. Next, this Part proposes that the public policy ration-
ales frequently advanced in support of a strict no-impeachment rule pale
in comparison to the need to limit racial bias's devastating effects. Last,
this Part acknowledges the limitations of Peiia-Rodriguez and asserts that
the racial bias exception's maximum impact will only be realized if the
exception is coupled with strategically crafted, race-conscious jury in-
structions.
117. Id. at 871 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
118. Id. at 872-74 ("Our common-law history does not establish that-in either 1791 (when the
Sixth Amendment was ratified) or in 1868 (when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified)-a defend-
ant had the right to impeach a verdict with juror testimony of juror misconduct. In fact, it strongly
suggests that such evidence was prohibited.").
119. Id. at 874.
120. Id.
121. United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. 361, 366 (1851), overruledin part by Rosen v. United States,
245 U.S. 467 (1918).
122. Peiia-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869.
123. Id. at 868.
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A. Despite the Judiciary's Many Efforts, the Criminal Justice and Jury
Trial Systems Remain Deeply Racist Institutions
In Peila-Rodriguez, Justice Kennedy remarked on the criminal justice
system's long history with racism and the Court's perennial role in trying
to eradicate that bias. 124 In enacting the Civil War Amendments, the nation
sought to "purge racial prejudice from the administration of justice."1 25
And by continually ruling that racial discrimination in all areas of public
life is impermissible, the judicial system worked to advance this same
goal.12 6 But history has deftly shown that adding a bar on racial discrimi-
nation to the Constitution and using the legal system to enforce that bar
has not been enough to eliminate racial bias.127
Immediately after the passage of the Civil War Amendments, states
across the nation sought to circumvent those amendments, and the juris-
prudence accompanying them, by passing laws and enacting practices that
relegated racial minorities to a permanent status as second-class citi-
zens.128 These actions extended to the jury system with many Southern
states refising to select minorities as jurors, a practice that soon led to all-
white juries overwhelmingly voting to convict people of color while sim-
ultaneously voting to acquit white defendants charged with crimes against
minorities.129 "Whether it was freeing the white defendants who murdered
Emmett Till 130 or convicting black defendants who were falsely ac-
cused,'3 1 history is littered with ugly incidents of juries using their power
124. Id. at 867.
125. Id
126. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84-85 (1986) (holding that excluding a prospective
juror from the jury solely because of race violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (holding that statutes that prohibit interracial
marriage violate the qual protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment); Brown
v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that racial segregation within public schools vio-
lates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
127. See Donald E. Lively & Stephen Plass, Equal Protection: The Jurisprudence ofDenial and
Evasion, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1307, 1323-29 (1991) (describing the Fourteenth Amendment's legal
ineffectiveness in eliminating racial bias from the nation's laws and policies).
128. See id. at 1326-28.
129. Peiia-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 867 (describing a year in Texas where all-white juries decided
500 prosecutions of white defendants who had been charged with murdering black people and acquit-
ted every single white defendant); see also, e.g., Batson, 476 U.S. at 84-85 (1986) (holding that liti-
gants may not exclude a prospective juror because of race); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527
(1973) (holding that the Constitution sometimes requires defendants be allowed to voir dire on racial
bias); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits excluding a juror because of his or her race), abrogated by Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975).
130. See The Murder of Enmitt Till, LIBR. CONGRESS: C.R. HIST. PROJECT,
https://www.loc.gov/collections/civil-rights-history-project/articles-and-essays/murder-of-emmett-
till (last visited Dec. 28, 2017).
131. See Jacey Fortin, Florida Apologizes for 'Gross Injustices' to Four Black Men, Decades
Later, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/27/us/groveland-four-apology-
florida.html; see also GILBERT KING, DEVIL IN THE GROVE (2012) (recounting the wrongful convic-
tions of the Groveland Boys, a group of four black men falsely accused of rape by a white woman).
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to disadvantage minorities."l32 While Congressl33 and the Court 34 have
both spent decades trying to confront and minimize racial bias within the
legal system, such bias-including within the jury trial system-still ex-
It.131ists.
The criminal justice system thrives on discretion.136 Police cannot ar-
rest everyone who breaks the law.'37 Prosecutors have "enormous leeway
in deciding whom and what to charge," as well as immense control over
plea bargaining.13 8 And juries have near total discretion in reaching ver-
dicts, the review of which is often highly deferential to the jury's initial
finding.' 39 Discretion allows the criminal justice system to best use and
prioritize its limited resources, while giving its actors-jurors included-
the power to make sure that the punishment fits the crime.140 It is highly
unlikely that the criminal justice system would remain workable without
this discretion and the flexibility and resourcefulness it provides. 141
However, racial bias also thrives on this same discretion.142 Despite
its benefits, discretion within the criminal justice system is arbitrary and
lacks a mechanism for public accountability.143 These flaws give racism a
friendly place to breed, develop, and grow.144 Racial bias within the legal
system effectively "hides behind discretion" and since every part of the
legal process incorporates discretion to some extent, opportunities for rac-
ism to alter a defendant's life exist at every stage. 14 Minorities are more
likely to be stopped by the police than whites.146 Minorities are also ar-
rested and incarcerated at numbers highly disproportionate to their per-
centage of the population.147 And minorities are overwhelmingly un-
derrepresented in jury pools.1 48
132. Leipold, supra note 63, at 579 (footnote omitted).
133. Peiia-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 867.
134. Id.; see also supra notes 73, 126 and accompanying text.
135. See Peila-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 861-62.
136. Leipold, supra note 63, at 564.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and Race. The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67
FORDHAM L. REv. 13, 20, 27 (1998).
140. See id at 20.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 21; Leipold, supra note 63, at 564.
143. See Davis, supra note 139, at 20-21.
144. See id at 21.
145. Leipold, supra note 63, at 564.
146. See id at 565.
147. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACIAL AND ETHNIC JUSTICE IN
STATE PRISONS 4 (2016); Arrests by Race 2014, FBI: UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING,
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2014/crime-in-the-u.s.-2014/tables/table-43 (last visited Sept. 11,
2017).
148. Leipold, supra note 63, at 579 n.82.
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Studies continually show that black, Latino, and Hispanic drivers are
more likely to be stopped and searched by police than their white counter-
parts.149 A 2011 Bureau of Justice Statistics study found that thirteen per-
cent of black drivers were stopped by police, compared to only ten percent
of white drivers.15 0 And a 2017 study by Stanford University found strik-
ingly similar results: black and Latino drivers were stopped and searched
at least twice as frequently as whites. That same study also concluded
that black and Latino drivers were stopped and searched "on the basis of
far less evidence" than white drivers,152 and that those same minority driv-
ers were over twenty percent more likely than whites to receive a ticket.153
Statistics also repeatedly show that people of color are arrested at
percentages highly disproportionate to their total population.15 4 According
to the 2010 U.S. Census, black people make up 13.6% of the U.S. popula-
tion, Hispanics and Latinos 16.3%,156 and whites 74.8%.'15 But some-
how, in 2014, black people were nearly twenty-eight percent of those ar-
rested for crimes, while another eighteen percent of those arrested were
Hispanics and Latinos.158 In addition to being arrested at higher percent-
ages, people of color are also incarcerated at greater rates than whites.15 9
A 2016 report by the Sentencing Project found that black people were "in-
carcerated in state prisons at a rate . . . 5.1 times the imprisonment of
whites."'60 And despite making up barely sixteen percent of the U.S. pop-
ulation, twenty-one percent of those incarcerated in state prisons were His-
panic.161 Despite the benefits that discretion provides to the criminal jus-
tice system, these statistics vividly demonstrate that this broad discretion
149. Traffic Stops, BUREAU JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=702 (last
visited Sept. 11, 2017); Richard Winton, Black and Latino Drivers Are Searched Based on Less Evi-
dence and Are More Likely to Be Arrested, Stanford Researchers Find, L.A. TIMES (June 19, 2017,
11:25 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-In-stanford-minority-drive-disparties-
20170619-story.html.
150. Traffic Stops, supra note 149; see also Winton, supra note 149 (describing the results of a
2017 study which found that "[fjor every 100 black drivers, about 15 were pulled over, compared with
10 stops for every 100 white and Latino driver[s]").
151. Winton, supra note 149. Specifically, this study found that for every one hundred stops,
black drivers were searched six times, Latino drivers were searched four times, and white drivers were
only searched two times. Id.
152. Id.
153. Findings, STAN. OPEN POLICING PROJECT, https://openpolicing.stanford.edu/findings (last
visited Sept. 11, 2017).
154. Leipold, supra note 63, at 561 n.9.
155. SONYA RASTOGI ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE BLACK POPULATION: 2010, at 3
(2011).
156. SHARON R. ENNIS ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE HISPANIC POPULATION: 2010, at 3
(2011).
157. LINDSAY HIXSON ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE WHITE POPULATION: 2010, at 3
(2011).
158. See Arrests by Race 2014, supra note 147.
159. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 147, at 3.
160. Id.
161. ENNIS ET AL., supra note 156; THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 147.
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also provides state actors with "a nearly uninterrupted chance to make il-
legitimate judgments based on race."'62
Trial by jury also thrives on discretion, allowing the influence of ra-
cial bias to further seep into the legal system's decision-making process.163
State- and city-level studies show that people of color are frequently un-
derrepresented on juries, even in cities where minorities make up large
chunks of the total population.1 6 4 In Caddo Parish, Louisiana, a 2015 study
found that while forty-eight percent of the parish's population was black,
"the typical 12-member criminal jury [often] had fewer than four blacks
on it.',165 In 2011, a study ofjuries in New York state found nearly identical
results: People of color were continually "underrepresented in many coun-
ties where they constitute[d] more than 10 percent of the adult over-18
population."l66 And during a six-month span in 2016, public defenders in
San Francisco, California, "counted at least six trials in which not one pro-
spective juror was African American."l67
A wealth of research has also found that juries are more likely to con-
vict people of color than whites, even when the facts in two separate cases
are identical.168 In a 1982 mock juror study, white students read transcripts
of four different crimes (rape, murder, drug sale, and burglary) and then
rated a hypothetical defendant's likelihood of guilt.' 69 The race of the de-
fendant was systematically varied while the facts of the case remained
static.170 In seven out of eight instances, the participants' "estimated prob-
ability of guilt was higher for the black defendant than the white defend-
ant.""'7 A 1983 study involving Hispanic defendants came to the same
conclusion: white jurors were more likely than their Hispanic counterparts
162. Leipold, supra note 63, at 564.
163. See id.
164. See, e.g., Vivian Ho, For SF's Black Defendants, It's Hard to Find Jury of Peers, S.F.
CHRON. (Mar. 4, 2015, 5:07 PM), http://www.sfchronicle.com/crime/article/For-SF-s-black-
defendants-it-s-hard-to-find-10977625.php; Adam Liptak, Exclusion ofBlacks From Juries Raises
Renewed Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 16, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/17/us/politics/ex-
clusion-of-blacks-from-juries-raises-renewed-scrutiny.html; Dan Rivoli, In N.Y Jury Pools, Blacks
and Hispanics Underrepresented: Report, INT'L Bus. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2011, 6:34 PM),
http://www.ibtimes.com/ny-jury-pools-blacks-hispanics-underrepresented-report-380828.
165. Liptak, supra note 164. The article also noted that "[m]uch of the gap had nothing to do
with peremptory strikes. Of the 8,318 potential jurors in the study, which reviewed 332 trials from
2003 to 2012, only 35 percent were black." Id.
166. Rivoli, supra note 164. More specifically, black residents in Erie County (home to Buffalo,
NY) made up twelve percent of the population but only seven percent of jurors; black people were
underrepresented by thirty percent in Staten Island juries; and Hispanics were unrepresented in jury
pools for every single borough of New York City. Id.
167. Ho, supra note 164.
168. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1611, 1625-
26(1985).





to attribute guilt to a hypothetical Hispanic defendant. 172 And more re-
cently, a 2012 empirical study of Florida juries found that when no black
jurors were in a case's jury pool, "black defendants [were] convicted at an
81 percent rate" compared to white defendants, who were only convicted
at a 66 percent rate.173 In the same study, the researchers also found that
the conviction rate equalizes-seventy-one percent conviction rate for
black defendants, compared to a seventy-three percent conviction rate for
whites-when the jury pool includes at least one black potential juror.174
As this data demonstrates, the jury system is a very effective conduit
for racism, allowing it to flow into and throughout voir dire, deliberations,
and the final verdict. Again, one of the key reasons for this is the immense
amount of discretion invested in the jury system.175 The potential for racial
bias to tinge a decision is strongly exacerbated when "decisions are made
outside [of] the public eye."'7 6 This is precisely where juries deliberate.17 7
And much of that deliberation occurs without oversight, allowing a juror's
racial bias to easily stay secret. Moreover, racism's ability to co-opt the
jury-in addition to its effects on the criminal defendant in question-fur-
ther compounds the impact that racial bias exerts at the earlier stages of
the criminal justice process.179
While allowing jurors to deliberate in private and express candid
views is important, so is preventing criminal defendants from being con-
victed because of their race. And failing to provide defendants with a rem-
edy when their conviction is based on blatant racial bias is antithetical to
the criminal justice system's basic guarantees of fairness and impartial-
ity. so Our current system of trial by jury provides jurors with a nearly un-
fettered ability to convict defendants based on racist beliefs, which jurors
routinely do.'8 ' Such a fallacy sharply demonstrates why the Court's deci-
sion in Peiha-Rodriguez was a necessary step in the nation's continual ef-
forts to "overcome race-based discrimination."'82 And the correctness of
this decision is further evidenced by the fact that existing safeguards alone
172. Id. at 1629. These same white jurors were also more likely to think that the Hispanic de-
fendant was unintelligent and dishonest. Id.
173. Shamena Anwar et al., The Impact ofJury Race in Criminal Trials, 127 Q.J. ECON. 1017,
1019 (2012).
174. Id.




179. Id. at 582.
180. See Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 471-72 (1965) ("In essence, the right to jury trial
guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors. The failure
to accord an accused a fair hearing violates even the minimal standards of due process." (quoting Irvin
v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961)).
181. See generally id
182. Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 871 (2017).
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are never enough to bar racial bias's entrance into the black box and in-
stead often further insulate racism from attack.183
B. The Existing Safeguards Provided by Voir Dire and Courtroom Over-
sight Are Not Enough to Protect Criminal Defendants from Juror Ra-
cial Bias
The legal system relies on "juries to be the primary backstop against
race-based behavior."'84 But current safeguards designed to ensure that ra-
cial bias cannot infiltrate the jury, including voir dire and courtroom over-
sight, are extremely ineffective at keeping racism out of the courtroom and
evince the need for something more.18 5 In no place can the woeful inade-
quacy of these safeguards be seen more intensely than in the experiences
of many criminal defendants of color, whose guilty verdicts were irrepa-
rably tainted by a juror's overt racial bias.
Peila-Rodriguez is but a single example of how existing safeguards
routinely fail to weed out racially biased jurors. 18 In United States v. Hen-
ley,18 7 a jury convicted three black men on drug trafficking charges.'88
During voir dire, the jurors were directly asked if racial bias would affect
their ability to be impartial.189 No jurors indicated any concerns about pos-
sible bias.'90 Yet after the defendants were convicted, it came to the court's
attention that while carpooling to the courthouse a juror had allegedly re-
marked to his fellow jurors that "[a]ll the niggers should hang" and "[t]he
niggers are guilty."'91
In Benally v. United States,192 a jury convicted an American Indian
man of assault with a deadly weapon.193 A day after the verdict was ren-
dered, a juror came forward alleging that during deliberations the jury
foreman had said that "[w]hen Indians get alcohol, they all get drunk" and
that "when they get drunk, they get violent."' 94 These comments were ac-
companied by a larger group sentiment of needing to convict the defendant
to "send a message back to the reservation."9 5 Again, the jurors in Benally
were asked about their ability to be impartial on race and not a single juror
raised any concerns of bias.196
183. Id. at 868-69.
184. Leipold, supra note 63, at 588.
185. Peha-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868-69.
186. Id. at 861-62.
187. 238 F.3d 1111, 1112 (9th Cir. 2001).
188. Id
189. Id at 1121.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1113-14.
192. 546 F.3d 1230, 1231 (10th Cir. 2008), abrogated by Peila-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855.
193. Id.
194. Id. (alteration in original).
195. Id. at 1231-32.
196: Id. at 1231.
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Finally, in United States v. Shalhout,'97 two men of Middle Eastern
descent were convicted on wire fraud and money laundering charges.198
At trial the defendants sought to voir dire potential jurors on racial bias,
only to have that request denied by the trial court judge who was "not con-
vinced that the questions were necessary."l99 But a week after the guilty
verdict was entered an alternate juror came forward alleging that during
deliberations the other alternate juror had stated "[y]ou know they [sic]
guilty, right? They [sic] lying. All Arabs are liars, are thieves[,]" a senti-
ment reportedly shared by the jurors responsible for deciding the case.200
In Henley, Benally, and Shalhout, neither voir dire nor courtroom
oversight could catch the racial bias pervading the jury until a verdict had
been entered and it was too late to stop the conviction.20' And not a single
juror in any of these three cases disclosed this bias until after the trial was
over.202
In all three cases, the existing safeguards cited to so enthusiastically
in the Court's previous decisions on the no-impeachment rule did nothing
to prevent racial bias from effortlessly sauntering into the jury room and
influencing the conviction of numerous criminal defendants of color. And
these few examples are but a small sampling of the many cases where ex-
isting safeguards failed to uncover racial bias.03 Courts rely on juries to
204
serve as the legal system's final barrier against racism. Yet as the above
examples demonstrate, voir dire and courtroom oversight alone are rou-
tinely incapable of ensuring that jurors do not make illegitimate judgments
based on race, thereby denying criminal defendants the right to a fair trial
205and an impartial jury.
The above examples also show that it is far too easy for jurors to lie
about and hide their racial bias, even when directly asked about hose bi-
ases. Unlike intoxication or falling asleep, overt bias is nearly impossible
197. 507 F. App'x 201 (3d Cir. 2012).
198. Id.
199. Id. (quoting the district court).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 202-04; Benally, 546 F.3d at 1231-32; United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1111-
12 (9th Cir. 2001).
202. Shalhout, 507 F. App'x at 202-04; Benally, 546 F.3d at 1231-32; Henley, 238 F.3d at 1112.
In Henley, a juror did go to the defendant's house while the trial was ongoing to tell him about the
alleged misconduct, as part of a ploy to acquire a job with the Los Angeles Rams. Henley, 238 F.3d at
1112-13. However, the facts of the case do not indicate that either defense counsel or the judge knew
about the misconduct until that same juror was deposed by defense counsel after the trial. Id. at 1113.
203. See, e.g., Leipold, supra note 63, at 579-81; Miller, supra note 32, at 876-77, 897; see also
United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 78 (1st Cir. 2009) (juror remarked during deliberations that "I
guess we're profiling but [Hispanics] cause all the trouble"); Shillcut v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1156
(7th Cir. 1987) (juror stated during deliberations, "[1]et's be logical. He's black and he sees a seven-
teen-year-old white girl-I know the type."); Martinez v. Food City, Inc., 658 F.2d 369, 372 (5th Cir.
1981) (juror commented during deliberations that the appellant "'should be taught a lesson' for hiring
Mexican nationals").
204. Leipold, supra note 63, at 588.
205. Peila-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 868-69 (2017).
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for judges, attorneys, and others to catch during a trial because such bias
cannot be readily detected through silent observation.206 Voir dire is also
highly ineffective at eliciting implicit bias, which research shows is now
racism's most prevalent form.207 And although a juror's bias may not play
a role in the actual trial, once jurors have made their way to the jury room
and begun engaging in deliberations it becomes easy for both implicit and
explicit biases to creep out and direct a juror's vote.208 These biases, un-
caught by either voir dire or courtroom oversight, are then allowed to dras-
tically influence and undermine the jury's final verdict.2 09
Additionally, "the Supreme Court has virtually eliminated any con-
stitutional right to question jurors [about] racial prejudice."210 Defendants
are only entitled to voir dire on racial bias in two narrow instances: when
a "capital defendant is accused of an interracial crime" and "when the facts
in a case are such that it would be a violation of due process to deny ques-
tioning on the issue of racial bias."211 In all other cases, allowing race-
relevant voir dire is left to the discretion of the judge, who may easily fail
to realize when such voir dire is needed.212 The purposes of voir dire-to
elicit bias and strike biased jurors for cause-cannot be fulfilled if most
defendants of color are not allowed to conduct effective voir dire.2 13 And
if the purposes of voir dire are so limited in the majority of cases involving
nonwhite defendants, then it is undeniable that voir dire alone cannot pre-
vent racial bias from slipping into the jury room.
The cases cited above also give credence to Justice Kennedy's argu-
ment that jurors are unlikely to come forward during a trial with allega-
tions of racial bias,214 as not a single juror addressed the racial bias on their
206. Amanda R. Wolin, What Happens in the Jury Room Stays in the Jury Room ... But Should
It? A Conflict Between the Sixth Amendment and Federal Rule ofEvidence 606(b), 60 UCLA L. REV.
262, 282 (2012).
207. Johnson, supra note 168, at 1675. ("[S]uperficial questions concerning whether the jurors
harbor prejudice against blacks that would prevent them from being impartial are extremely unlikely
to provoke disclosure of such bias. General questions do not reach hidden inconsistent atti-
tudes... . Asking a general question about impartiality and race is like asking whether one believes in
equality for blacks; jurors may sincerely answer yes, they believe in equality and yes, they can be
impartial, yet oppose interracial marriage and believe that blacks are more prone to violence.").
208. See id at 1675-76.
209. Id.; Wolin, supra note 206, at 288.
210. Johnson, supra note 168, at 1670.
211. Peter A. Joy, Race Matters in Jury Selection, 109 Nw. U. L. REV. ONLINE 180, 182-83
(2015); see, e.g., Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 525, 527 (1973) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment required the trial court to voir dire on racial bias in a case where a well-known black civil
rights activist who was charged with possession of marijuana asserted that law enforcement officials
had framed him to deter his civil rights work).
212. United States v. Shalhout, 507 F. App'x 201, 202-05 (3d Cir. 2012); Joy, supra note 211,
at 183.
213. Johnson, supra note 168, at 1670.




respective juries until the trial was over. This may be, as Justice Ken-
nedy stated in Peia-Rodriguez, because jurors are afraid to call fellow ju-
rors racist.216 But the failure of other jurors to tell the court about a fellow
juror's racism may also stem from the legal system's own hesitancy to talk
about racial bias. If the topic of racial bias is not sufficiently addressed
during voir dire, or jurors are not instructed on it prior to deliberations,
jurors may not know that they can, and should, report a fellow juror's
bias.217 Without hearing or knowing anything to the contrary, some jurors
may even assume racial bias is allowed since any biased jurors who make
218it to deliberations were deemed acceptable to the court during voir dire.
Even in Benally, where the Tenth Circuit held that the right to a jury
trial was not infringed by a juror's alleged racism, the court noted that
existing safeguards are fallible in cases of racial bias because "[t]he judge
will probably not be able to identify racist jurors based on trial con-
duct . . . and voir dire might be a feeble protection if a juror is determined
to lie."219 Because precedent and history show that current safeguards are
an ineffective way to limit racial bias's influence on a jury's verdict,220 an
additional safeguard is necessary to provide defendants with a remedy
when their guilt is determined by such bias. The racial bias exception to
the no-impeachment rule is an effective first step in doing just that. But
unless jurors know about the exception and are encouraged to report ra-
cially charged misconduct, it is dangerously likely that Peiha-Rodriguez's
racial bias exception may merely be an exception in name and not in prac-
tice.
C. The Severe Effects of Racial Bias Supersede the Public Policy Argu-
ments Advanced in Support a Strict No-Impeachment Rule
Despite the high prevalence and devastating effects of racial bias
within the criminal justice system, the mere existence of racism on its own
is not enough to justify a complete upheaval of the no-impeachment rule.
The strict no-impeachment rule that existed pre-Peiha-Rodriguez (without
any exceptions for a juror's racial bias) is supported by many public policy
arguments that courts have long found convincing and that the creation of
a new exception to the rule must be balanced against. However, despite
the validity of these policy goals, a thorough analysis of what the goals
really mean and do reveals that modifying the no-impeachment rule to in-
clude a racial bias exception would barely change the way that the rule
215. Shalhout, 507 F. App'x at 203; United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1231-32 (10th Cir.
2008), abrogated by Pefia-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855; United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, I112
(9th Cir. 2001).
216. Peha-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869.
217. Wolin, supra note 206, at 282-83.
218. Id.
219. Benally, 546 F.3d at 1240.
220. If racial bias is ever to be fully eliminated from the criminal justice system, voir dire also
must be modified to better elicit racial bias from potential jurors. See infra note 283.
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operates. And the ever-existing concerns of racial bias, as well as the dan-
ger of denying access to a fair trial, provide an additional rationale for
finding that adding a racial bias exception to the no-impeachment rule out-
weighs the rule's general policy objectives.
Three main policy rationales for a strict no-impeachment rule are
continually advanced by the rule's supporters and have been repeatedly
relied on and endorsed by the Supreme Court.221 According to those who
support a strict no-impeachment rule, a strict rule is necessary because it
(1) prevents jurors from being harassed by limiting exposure to postverdict
pressure;222 (2) encourages free and open jury deliberation because jurors
need not worry about reprisal;223 and (3) promotes the need for finality by
224
giving legal matters an end point.
These policy goals do have a degree of validity. A strict no-impeach-
ment rule-with very few exceptions-would, at least minimally, prevent
jurors from being harassed about verdicts and deliberations following a
225trial. By making almost any information learned from jurors about their
deliberations inadmissible, litigants are likely to be deterred from wasting
valuable time obtaining essentially worthless te timony.226 A strict no-im-
peachment rule also encourages free and open jury deliberations, a critical
piece of the jury trial.227 Keeping deliberations confidential allows jurors
to candidly express their views, "without fear of embarrassment or re-
prisal,"228 which in turn permits ideas to be freely exchanged, prejudices
to be revealed, and well-reasoned arguments o prevail.229 It is not un-
founded to say that allowing jurors to be questioned about their delibera-
tions could chill the conversations jurors have230 and cause them to become
overly concerned with public reprisal.231 Last, a strict no-impeachment
221. James W. Diehm, Impeachment ofJury Verdicts: Tanner v. United States and Beyond, 65
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 389, 394-95 (1991); see, e.g., Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 124 (1987)
("Public policy requires a finality to litigation. And common fairness requires that absolute privacy be
preserved for jurors to engage in the full and free debate necessary to the attainment of just verdicts.
Jurors will not be able to function effectively if their deliberations are to be scrutinized in post-trial
litigation." (quoting S. REP. No. 93-1277, at 13-14 (1974), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051,
7060)); McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 268 (1915) (stating that allowing jurors to impeach verdicts
through testimony about deliberations "would open the door to the most pernicious arts and tampering
with jurors," that "[i]t would lead to the grossest fraud and abuse," and that "no verdict would be
safe").
222. Diehm, supra note 221.
223. Id. at 399-400.
224. Id. at 402.
225. Id at 395.
226. Id.
227. Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 874-75 (2017) (Alito, J., dissenting).
228. Diehm, supra note 221, at 399.
229. Id. at 399-400.
230. Id. at 400.
231. Id. Diehm goes on to argue that, were jury deliberations not protected from public scrutiny,
"meritorious, but unpopular, views would be repressed, the timid would not speak, and ... the parties
would not have the benefit of open deliberations. Even worse, jurors may feel pressured to render
popular, rather than fair, verdicts." Id.
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rule supports the need for a verdict to be the final say in a trial. 232 By pre-
venting juror testimony from challenging verdicts, the legal system's in-
terest in finality is promoted,233 cases are decided when evidence is still
fresh and witnesses are readily available,2 34 and public confidence in the
legal system is maintained.23 5 But despite the validity of these policy ra-
tionales, they are still an insufficient basis for justifying a total bar on the
use of juror testimony to challenge verdicts tainted in blatant racism.
Protecting jurors from postverdict harassment is a noble goal. But
concerns over jurors being harassed are misplaced.236 This is because Rule
606(b)'s exceptions for outside influence and extraneous information al-
ready allow jurors to be harassed and pressured after a trial.237 The vague-
ness surrounding exactly what either of those exceptions mean has "pro-
vided losing counsel ample room to fish for potentially admissible testi-
mony concerning juror misconduct."238 And with high hopes that they
might uncover information that falls within an exception and allows a ver-
dict to be challenged, litigants eagerly take advantage of this freedom to
talk with jurors about their deliberations.239 Because Rule 606(b) already
allows parties to harass jurors, using that same concern to argue against a
racial bias exception to the rule makes little sense.240 Such an exception
merely creates one more topic of conversation for litigants to probe jurors
on, who are already questioned with gusto after most trials.241
Encouraging free and open jury deliberations is also an important
goal. But this goal too falters in the face of racial bias. First, to some de-
gree, jurors already expect hat the statements they make during delibera-
tions will be disclosed to others outside of the courtroom.24 2 Rule 606(b)
232. Id. at 402.
233. Mark Cammack, The Jurisprudence ofJury Trials: The No Impeachment Rule and the Con-
ditions for Legitimate Decision Making, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 57, 77 (1993); Diehm, supra note 221,
at 402.
234. Diehm, supra note 221, at 402 ("It is well recognized that, unlike fine wine, steaks, and
cheeses, lawsuits do not improve with age.").
235. Id. ("[A]t some point, litigation must end, and ... the community must be able to rely on
court decisions as final. Destructive uncertainty may develop if courts are viewed as indecisive, and
verdicts can be attacked months or even years after the litigation has ended.").
236. Pefia-Rodriguez v. People, 350 P.3d 287, 297 (Colo. 2015) (Marquez, J., dissenting), rev'd,
137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).
237. Id.
238. Victor Gold, Juror Competency to Testify that a Verdict Was the Product ofRacial Bias, 9
ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 125, 131 (1993).
239. See Peha-Rodriguez, 350 P.3d at 297 (Mirquez, J., dissenting); Gold, supra note 238, at
131, 131 n.28 ("Since the [no-impeachment] rule has numerous exceptions, and in criminal cases in-
quiries into constitutional violations might be appropriate despite the language of the rule, the rule
does not eliminate the need for the conscientious lawyer to interview jurors to assess whether the jurors
have committed misconduct and whether this particular type of misconduct is susceptible to juror
testimony.").
240. See Peha-Rodriguez, 350 P.3d at 297 (Mdrquez, ., dissenting).
241. See id.; Gold, supra note 238, at 131 n.28.
242. Peha-Rodriguez, 350 P.3d at 297 (Mdrquez, J., dissenting); see Wolin, supra note 206, at
294-95 (explaining that it is known to many jurors that other jurors often conduct postverdict inter-
views with the press and even write books about their jury experiences, leading to an implied under-
standing that juror statements made during deliberations are not confidential).
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does not prohibit jurors from talking about their verdicts, it only bars using
that testimony to challenge verdicts.24 3 And jurors routinely and voluntar-
ily reveal details of their deliberations to friends, family, and even the me-
dia.244 Knowing that the contents of jury deliberations may become public
knowledge does not appear to overly chill deliberations, and it is unlikely
that deliberations would be hampered any further if allegations of racial
bias were admissible to challenge verdicts.245
Moreover, even if allowing testimony about juror racism to challenge
verdicts does chill some deliberations, that is not enough to justify the total
lack of a racial bias exception to the no-impeachment rule. While chilling
jury deliberations even a little is an extraordinary measure, racism is an
246
extraordinary problem that has done anything but fade over time. Rac-
ism within the criminal justice and jury trial systems is a stark and severe
problem24 7 that requires an extreme solution, and we should be willing to
chill jury deliberations slightly to prevent criminal defendants from being
convicted largely or solely on the basis of race.
We expect jurors to be neutral decision makers and even use jury in-
structions to tell jurors that racial bias has no place in the courtroom.248
243. Wolin, supra note 206, at 294-95.
244. Id. at 295.
245. Id.
246. See, e.g., Justin Jouvenal, Third Noose in a Week Found in the District, This Time in South-
east, WASH. POST (June 3, 2017), https://www.wasbingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/third-noose-
in-a-week-found-in-dc-this-time-in-southeast/2017/06/03/e79fdc2a-4868-ll e7 98cd-
af64b4fe2dfcstory.btml (describing a span of time where multiple nooses were found throughout
Washington, D.C., including near an elementary school and outside of the National Museum of Afri-
can American History and Culture); Sarah Posner, After Charlottesville Rally Ends in Violence, Alt-
Right Vows to Return, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www.rollingstone.com/poli-
tics/news/charlottesville-white-supremacist-rally-erupts-in-violence-w497446 (recounting a day in
August 2017, where white supremacists rioted in Charlottesville, Virginia and chanted various racially
charged phrases including "white lives matter," "you will not replace us," and the Nazi slogan "blood
and soil"); Janell Ross, From Mexican Rapists to Bad Hombres, the Trump Campaign in Two Mo-
ments, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2016/10/20/from-mexican-rapists-to-bad-hombres-the-trump-campaign-in-two-moments
(noting that during then-candidate Donald Trump's presidential announcement speech he stated that
"[w]hen Mexico sends its people, they're not sending their best .... They're sending people that have
lots of problems, and they're bringing those problems with us. They're bringing drugs. They're bring-
ing crime. They're rapists.").
247. In their respective dissents in Peha-Rodriguez, Justices Thomas and Alito assert that the
majority's concerns about racial bias are admirable but overstated, particularly when weighed against
public policy concerns. See Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 874 (2017) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) ("In its attempt to stimulate a 'thoughtful, rational dialogue' on race relations, the Court
today ... imposes a uniform, national rule. The Constitution does not require such a rule." (citation
omitted) (quoting id. at 871 (majority opinion)); id at 875 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court is surely
correct that even a tincture of racial bias can inflict great damage on [the jury] system . . . . But until
today, the argument that the Court now finds convincing has not been thought to be sufficient to over-
come confidentiality rules .... ). However, as this Comment demonstrates throughout, racial bias is
still very much a problem and by minimizing its impact on the judicial system, the dissenting justices
merely demonstrate a failure to see racial bias's true specter. See supra notes 126-32 and accompany-
ing text.
248. See CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: TENTH CIRCUIT § 1.04 (2011) ("It is also
your duty to base your verdict solely upon the evidence, without prejudice or sympathy. That was the
promise you made and the oath you took.").
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Enforcing this expectation through the racial bias exception simply makes
logical sense. And while allowing jurors to deliberate without fear of re-
proach is important, freedom to deliberate in a manner that effectively al-
lows "the majority [to use] its values to demean the rights of minorities"
should not be given carte blanche.249 Racial bias, both generally and more
specifically within the judicial system, is widespread and devastating
enough to sacrifice some modicum of free deliberation to better ensure that
criminal defendants are not convicted because of immutable characteris-
tics.
Finally, while the interest in finality is another important goal, this
interest too is not enough to justify a no-impeachment rule without a racial
bias exception. The interest in finality and verdict stability has long been
weighed against competing interests of fairness and accuracy, and the in-
terest in finality has not always been deemed more important.25 This is
particularly true in the case ofjury deliberations.2 5 1 When juries reach ver-
dicts by way of an improper procedure-such as racial bias-the resulting
verdict can easily be one that is "so fundamentally unfair . . . [that] there
252is little reason to protect [it]" simply because of the interest in finality.
And due process "contemplates that [jury] decisions be based on a rational
evaluation of the evidence," meaning that "where [a] jury employs an ir-
rational procedure to reach a verdict" finality can easily be outweighed by
the competing value of fairness.25 3 While ensuring an end to litigation is
crucial to the stability of the judicial system, ensuring that that end point
is reached at the expense of a fair and accurate verdict, including verdicts
that were the result of racial bias, can do just as much (if not more) to
damage the judicial system as allowing verdicts to be challenged can.254
249. 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 45, § 6072. Allowing jurors to use racial bias to decide
cases also arguably allows verdicts to be decided based on facts not in evidence, thus violating a basic
tenet of the right to a fair trial. See Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73 (1965) ("The require-
ment that ajury's verdict 'must be based upon the evidence developed at trial' goes to the fundamental
integrity of all that is embraced in the constitutional concept of trial by jury.. .. In the constitutional
sense, trial by jury in a criminal case necessarily implies at the very least that the evidence developed
against a defendant shall come from the witness stand in a public courtroom where there is full judicial
protection of the defendant's right of conform, of cross-examination, and of counsel."); Bennett L.
Gershman, Contaminating the Verdict: The Problem ofJuror Misconduct, 50 S.D. L. REV. 322, 331
(2005).
250. 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 45, § 6072; Gold, supra note 238, at 131-32. In fact, recent
Supreme Court decisions even suggest "a trend focusing on truth and accuracy as the predominant
considerations in evaluating the role of the jury." 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 45, § 6072 n.54;
see, e.g., Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 334 (1980) ("'The basic purpose of a trial is the determi-
nation of truth,' and it is the jury to whom we have entrusted the responsibility for making this deter-
mination... . Any practice that threatens the jury's ability properly to perform that function poses a
similar threat to the truth-determining process itself." (citation omitted) (quoting Tehan v. United
States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966)); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978) (holding
that a five-person jury was unconstitutional because such a small jury could promote "inaccurate and
possibly biased decision making").
251. 27 WRIGHT & GOLD, supra note 45, § 6072 n.54.
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Moreover, the importance of finality has been superseded by con-
cerns for accuracy and due process in the past, most notably when it comes
to the use of newly acquired DNA evidence to overturn criminal ver-
dicts. 25 5 In the case of DNA, interests of fairness and accuracy, specifically
the use of accurate evidence and a desire to protect innocent defendants
from a prison sentence, were held to be more important than the competing
interest in finality. 25 6 Similarly, when it comes to racial bias, the interest
of finality within the judicial system "does not outweigh the more im-
portant goal" of ensuring that criminal defendants are convicted based on
257the evidence, not the racially charged feelings of jurors.
As with the other public policy reasons underlying a strict no-im-
peachment rule, the interest in finality does not justify allowing verdicts
based in racial bias to be unimpeachable. However, just because the inter-
ests in fairness and accuracy are more important han finality here does not
mean that jurors should be able to challenge verdicts years or decades after
they were rendered. Unlike DNA evidence, juror testimony about deliber-
ations loses accuracy over time, thus allowing concerns of finality to
weigh more heavily against those of accuracy as the months and years
pass.258 But the solution to this problem is simple: impose a reasonable
statute of limitations on when jurors can come forward with evidence to
impeach a verdict.
259
The public policy behind the no-impeachment rule provides valid and
compelling arguments for the rule's application. But those rationales are
not expansive enough to justify a bar on using juror testimony to challenge
racist verdicts. The "cumulative effect" of a strict no-impeachment rule-
without an exception for racial bias-is that a defendant can be arrested,
charged, convicted, and sentenced directly because of racism and without
a single inquiry into the decision maker's state of mind.260 Encouraging
free deliberation, promoting finality, and limiting juror harassment are all
important policy goals. But because of the nation's long and ongoing battle
with racism and the critical importance of fairness and accuracy, minimiz-
ing racial bias's impact on judicial decision making is paramount to the
admirable policy goals behind a strict no-impeachment rule.
255. See Sophia S. Chang, Protecting the Innocent: Post-Conviction DNA Exoneration,
36 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 285, 300 (2009); Brandon L. Garrett, DNA and Due Process, 78 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2919, 2952-53 (2010).
256. Chang, supra note 255; Garret, supra note 255.
257. Chang, supra note 255.
258. Diehm, supra note 221, at 402.
259. See infra Section III.D.
260. Leipold, supra note 63, at 582.
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D. To Truly Limit Racial Bias's Influence on Jury Verdicts, the Racial
Bias Exception Must Be Coupled with Improved Jury Instructions
In Peiha-Rodriguez, the Court took an important step forward in the
fight against racism when it ruled that the Constitution mandates an ex-
ception to the no-impeachment rule in cases of juror racial bias.2 61 How-
ever, in making that decision the Court declined to establish procedural
rules for handling accusations of a juror's racial bias or draw a dividing
line for when racially charged comments are offensive enough to mandate
impeachment.262 Leaving these decisions to the discretion of the trial
courts was a wise choice.263 Prior to the decision in Peiha-Rodriguez,
barely a third of states recognized a racial bias exception to their no-im-
peachment rules.264 Formulating broad rules on the procedural require-
ments or the right amount of racism based on the experiences of so few
states may well have been a foolhardy endeavor carrying with it a large
risk of getting the rules wrong. Before such rules can be crafted, a strong
line of precedent on the racial bias exception, at both the state and federal
level, must develop.2 65
But this line of precedent will never develop ifjurors are unsure about
whether they should speak out when racial bias finds its way into jury de-
liberations. Implementing universal jury instructions that encourage jurors
to report instances of bias after the conclusion of a trial is one way to en-
sure that this critical line of precedent develops. As Justice Kennedy noted,
it can be hard to call someone out, particularly a stranger, for displaying
racial bias.266 But if jurors knew that they could do just that after the con-
261. Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017).
262. Id at 870.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. To date, only a handful of cases have relied on Peha-Rodriguez in determining whether a
verdict should be impeached because of a juror's racial bias. See, e.g., Richardson v. Kornegay, No.
5:16-HC-2115-FL, 2017 WL 1133289, at *10 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 4, 2017) (finding that Peha-Rodriguez
was inapplicable when a black male juror was asked by another juror whether the black juror was
voting not guilty because the juror was a black man like the defendant); see also, e.g., Tharpe v. War-
den, No. 17-14027-P, 2017 WL 4250413, at *3 (11th Cir. Sept. 21, 2017) (holding that Peha-Rodri-
guez did not mandate a stay of the defendant's execution even though a juror later made racially
charged statements about the defendant in a postverdict affidavit), vacated and remanded sub nom.
Tharpe v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 545 (2018) (per curium) (holding that the juror's statement "presents a
strong factual basis for the argument that Tharpe's race affected [the juror's] vote for a death verdict").
More specifically, the juror in Tharpe stated in an affidavit taken several years after the verdict was
rendered that "I felt [the defendant], who wasn't in the good black folks category in my book, should
get the electric chair" and "[a]fter studying the Bible, I have wondered if black people even have
souls." Dakin Andone, Questions of Racial Bias Surround Black Man's Imminent Execution, CNN
(Sept. 25, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/24/us/keith-tharpe-georgia-execution/index.html.
Despite the judicial system's slow application of Peha-Rodriguez, instances of juror racial bias im-
pacting verdicts continue to come to light. See Mike Mullen, Juror: St. Paul Man 's 'Got to Be Guilty'
Because He's a 'Banger from the Hood,' CITY PAGES (Dec. 21, 2017),
http://www.citypages.com/news/juror-st-paul-mans-got-to-be-guilty-because-hes-a-banger-from-the-
hood/465660583.
266. Peha-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869.
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clusion of a trial and with a guarantee of secrecy, more jurors may be will-
ing to come forward with such allegations. In the short-term, this would
allow the criminal justice system to ensure that defendants are not being
convicted simply because of their race or ethnicity. And in the long-term,
this would allow a critical line of precedent to develop, which would then
aid the judicial system in formulating the narrowly tailored procedural and
substantive rules that the Supreme Court declined to create.
"For a juror to-affirmatively report ... biased statements requires that
[he or she] recognize the expression of bias, believe the expression is in-
appropriate, and be sufficiently motivated to report the incident."267 While
helping one recognize the expression of bias is not something strategically
crafted jury instructions can do, such instructions can inform jurors that
the expression of overt racial bias is improper and that jurors who hear
fellow jurors make racist remarks in connection with a trial have a positive
obligation to report that information.
The success of the Court's newly crafted racial bias exception de-
pends in part on jurors knowing that they can, and should, report instances
of bias that occur during deliberations. Jury instructions should be crafted
to tell jurors just that. While instructing jurors about the bar on using racial
bias to reach a verdict and the ability to later impeach racist verdicts is a
"minimal gesture,"2 68 it is a gesture that would do more to combat racial
bias in jury deliberations than most courts do now.269 Furthermore, jury
instructions put more than just jurors on notice that racial bias will not be
tolerated. Parties, attorneys, and even lay people merely observing a trial
will all hear these instructions and become aware of the new racial bias
267. West, supra note 42, at 186.
268. Edward Swaine, Pre-Deliberations Juror Misconduct, Evidential Incompetence, and Juror
Responsibility, 98 YALE L.J. 187,201 (1988).
269. See id at 202 ("Not only does the bulk of jury instruction occur after trial, but it tends to
pay little attention to the prospect ofjuror misconduct, particularly misconduct which does not involve
extraneous information or outside influences." (footnote omitted)).Race-conscious jury instructions
have also been shown to result in fairer verdicts. See Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth,
How Much Do We Really Know About Race and Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and Re-
search, 78 Cli-KENT L. REv. 997, 1015-16 (2003). Studies have repeatedly shown that individuals
are less likely to exhibit racial bias when race is made a salient issue in a case. Id. at 1012-16 (de-
scribing several studies where, once white mock jurors were made aware of the racial dynamics at
play, those same mock jurors then rendered unbiased decisions). And at least one study has shown that
jury instructions can help create this racial salience. Id. at 1007 (summarizing a study where mock
jurors who received jury instructions about racial prejudice evinced no racial bias when assigning guilt
ratings to hypothetical black and white defendants). But see JENNIFER K. ELEK & PAULA HANNAFORD-
AGOR, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CAN EXPLICIT INSTRUCTIONS REDUCE EXPRESSIONS OF
IMPLICIT BIAS? (2014) (finding that specialized jury instructions about race did not appear to signifi-
cantly influence the mock jurors' preference, confidence, or sentence severity).
Based on these studies, it is possible that using race conscious jury instructions to encourage jurors to
report racial bias might also stop jurors from relying on bias in the first place. See Pefia-Rodriguez,
137 S. Ct. at 871 (noting the role that jury instructions can play in limiting the use of the racial bias
exception to rare cases by encouraging jurors to confront "the flawed nature of reasoning that is
prompted or influenced by improper biases"); West, supra note 42, at 193. But see Johnson, supra
note 168, at 1678-79 (arguing that jury instructions would do little to limit racial bias because jurors
often do not understand jury instructions, racial bias is too subconscious, and drawing attention to bias
can place even greater emphasis on that characteristic).
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exception, as well as the more general prohibition on determining a de-
fendant's guilt based on race. The more people who are aware of and un-
derstand the racial bias exception, the broader and stronger the exception's
impact on decreasing juror racial bias will be.
Support for informing jurors about their ability to report instances of
misconduct dates all the way back to the codification of Rule 606(b) in
1975.270 Although the Advisory Conference chose the Senate's broader
no-impeachment rule over the House's narrow option, in doing so, the Ad-
visory Conference also remarked that "[t]he Conferees believe that jurors
should be encouraged to be conscientious in promptly reporting to the
court misconduct that occurs during jury deliberations."271 Although this
comment was likely directed at encouraging jurors to report instances of
misconduct prior to returning a verdict,272 as the rule that the Advisory
Conference was adopting would effectively bar most post-deliberation re-
273porting, this comment can still be read as giving support for the broader
proposition that juries should be informed about their ability and duty to
report instances of juror misbehavior, including racial bias.
Many state and federal courts already include a line about bias in their
27
model jury instructions. 2 The Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions promul-
gated for the District Courts within the Tenth Circuit inform jurors that
"[i]t is ... your duty to base your verdict solely upon the evidence, without
prejudice or sympathy."2 7 5 The Ninth Circuit goes further by telling jurors
that "[y]ou must decide the case solely on the evidence and the law and
must not be influenced by any personal likes or dislikes, opinions, preju-
dices, or sympathy."276 And the model jury instructions for the trial courts
within the Seventh Circuit go further yet by encouraging judges to add a
line to their instructions telling jurors not to "let any person's race, color,
religion, national ancestry, or gender influence you," when the facts of a
277
case make such an instruction appropriate.
Some states are even more explicit.278 California's model jury in-
structions make a specific reference to racial bias, stating, "[d]o not let
bias, sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion influence your decision. Bias
270. 27 WRIGHT & GOLD,supra note 45, § 6074.
271. H.R. REP. No. 93-1597, at 8 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098,
7102, 1974 WL 11681, at *7102 (emphasis added).
272. Peila-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 885 (Alito, J., dissenting).
273. H.R. REP.NO. 93-1597, at 8 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7098,
7102, 1974 WL 11681, at *7102.
274. See, e.g., 9TH ClR. MANUAL MODEL JURY INSTR. CRIM. § 3.1 (2010); 10TH CIR. CRIM.
PATTERN JURY INSTR. § 1.04 (2011); ILL. PATTERN JURY INSTR. CRIMINAL § 1.01 (2018); MASS.
CRIM. MODEL JURY INSTR. § 2.200 (2009).
275. 10TH CIR. CRIM. PATTERN JURY INSTR. § 1.04 (2011).
276. 9TH CIR. MANUAL MODEL JURY INSTR. CRIM. § 3.1 (2010).
277. 7TH CIR. FED. CRIM. JURY INSTR. § 1.01 (2012).
278. See, e.g., JUD. COUNCIL CAL. CRIM. JURY INSTR. § 200 (2017); 1-II CRIM. JURY INSTR. FOR
D.C., INSTRUCTION 2.102 (2017); see also infra note 280 and accompanying text.
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includes, but is not limited to, bias ... based on disability, gender, nation-
ality, national origin, race or ethnicity, religion, gender identity, sexual
orientation, age, [or] socioeconomic status."279 And Washington, D.C.'s
Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions also warn jurors about reaching a ver-
dict based on race: "You should determine the facts without prejudice,
fear, sympathy, or favoritism. You should not be improperly influenced
by anyone's race, ethnic origin, or gender."280
It is clear from the model jury instructions relied on by legal profes-
sionals nationwide that many courts have concluded that instructing juries
on racial bias is entirely acceptable and even encouraged. Based on this,
modifying jury instructions to inform jurors that they are forbidden from
relying on racial bias when convicting a criminal defendant seems easily
achievable. So does informing jurors that a verdict can be overturned if a
juror relies on overt racial bias in voting to convict a criminal defendant.
Ajury instruction informing jurors about the racial bias exception will also
need to stress that any reporting will be entirely confidential so that jurors
need not worry about harassment hat might result from their decision to
come forward. And to best protect the legal system's interest in finality,
this jury instruction should be coupled with a statute of limitations on
when juror racial bias can be reported.28 1
A model jury instruction considering these various dynamics might
look like this:
Juror Misconduct
It is your duty to base your verdict solely upon the evidence, without
relying on prejudice or bias. You should not allow bias or any kind of
prejudice based upon race or ethnicity to influence your decision. If
you find that another juror is relying on racial bias to determine
279. JUD. COUNCIL CAL. CRIM. JURY INSTR. § 200 (2017) (emphasis added). California's Model
Criminal Jury Instructions also allow the judge to "insert any other impermissible basis for bias as
appropriate," in the event that the listed bases are insufficient. Id.
280. 1-II CRIM. JURY INSTR. FOR D.C. INSTRUCTION 2.102 (2017) (emphasis added); see also
ARIz. PATTERN JURY INSTR. CRIM., PCI 2 (4th ed. 2016) ("In deciding this case, you are not to be
swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion, or public feeling.
Race, color, religion, national ancestry, gender or sexual orientation should not influence you.");
MASS. CRIM. MODEL JURY INSTR. § 2.200 (2009) ("Your verdict must be based solely on the evidence
developed at trial. It would be improper for you to consider any personal feelings about the defendant's
race, religion, national origin, sex or age." (supplemental instruction for relevant cases)); ILL.
PATTERN JURY INSTR. CRIMINAL § 1.01 (2018) ("You should not be influenced by any person's race,
color, religion, national ancestry, gender, or sexual orientation." (supplemental instruction for relevant
cases)).
281. This reasonable statute of limitations could be quite short. In most cases where jurors have
reported racial bias, that reporting happened within days or, at the most, a few weeks after the conclu-
sion of the trial. See, e.g., Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 861 (2017) (jurors mentioned
racist statements to defense counsel minutes after trial ended); United States v. Shalhout, 507 F. App'x
201, 203 (3d Cir. 2012) (juror contacted defense counsel one week after verdict was entered); United
States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1231 (10th Cir. 2008) (juror contacted defense counsel one day after
verdict was entered), abrogated by Pehia-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855. Based on this, a reasonable statute
of limitations need not be any longer a few months.
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whether the defendant is guilty, you are obligated to report that mis-
conduct to either the judge or an attorney. If you report another juror
for this misconduct, your identity and what you said will remain con-
fidential.
This misconduct can be reported after a verdict has been entered, so
long as it is reported within a reasonable time. If, after further evalua-
tion, the racial bias in question is found to be both severe enough and
directly linked to the juror's vote to convict, the verdict can be chal-
lenged and even overturned.
An instruction like the one proposed here could be invaluable in both
helping jurors check their racial bias at the courtroom door282 and ensuring
that the racial bias exception has the furthest reaching and greatest impact
possible. And while jury instructions alone will not solve the problem of
racial bias,2 83 notifying jurors that the sanctity of the nation's legal system
depends on them saying something when racial bias becomes the thir-
teenth juror could be an effective way to continue marching towards a
more racially just legal system.
CONCLUSION
In Pefia-Rodriguez v. Colorado, the Court held that the Sixth Amend-
ment requires an exception to the no-impeachment rule when a criminal
284
defendant's verdict is the result of overt racial bias2. Although modest,
this was the correct ruling, both because racial bias remains incredibly en-
trenched in our nation and because existing safeguards of voir dire and
courtroom oversight alone are not enough to prevent racial bias from in-
filtrating a jury.
"Race is an issue ... this nation cannot afford to ignore right now." 285
The Court's decision in Peila-Rodriguez was a vital step in acknowledging
and combatting racism's continued presence in and strong grip on the
criminal justice system. But this new racial bias exception will remain as
ineffective a safeguard as voir dire and courtroom oversight are if jurors
do not know that the use of racial bias in convicting a criminal defendant
is barred and thatjurors have an obligation to report such misconduct, even
282. See Peiha-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868.
283. As briefly mentioned above, see supra note 220 and accompanying text, the current safe-
guards that exist to uncover racial bias before a trial begins, specifically voir dire, need to be modified
to better elicit bias from potential jurors. Modifying how we draw jury pools, and ensuring that juries
are representative of the communities they adjudicate, could also help eliminate racial bias's impact
on jury verdicts. If jury instructions like the one proposed here were implemented nationwide and
coupled with race-conscious voir dire and venire selection, racism within the criminal justice system
could be strategically attacked from a variety of angles. Such a multi-faceted approach would help
mitigate the effects of racial bias on the judicial system much faster and more aggressively than any
of these single approaches could do alone.
284. Pefia-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868.
285. Ta-Nehisi Coates, Fear of a Black President, ATLANTIC (Sept. 2012), https://www.theat-
lantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/09/fear-of-a-black-president/309064 (quoting a speech by then-
presidential candidate Barack Obama about race-relations in the United States).
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after a trial has ended. If the racial bias exception is coupled with jury
instructions encouraging jurors to report racial bias when it enters their
deliberations, the exception could have a real, measurable impact on the
eradication of racial bias from both our legal system and our nation.
While racism will likely "never be solved, only managed,"2t 6 that
does not mean that we should not strive for a nation wholly free from the
ills of racial animus. The racial bias exception and a set of corresponding
jury instructions could be instrumental in doing just that.
Natalie A. Spiess
286. Leipold, supra note 63, at 603.
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